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Insurance Regulation in Germany: Markets or Norms?
A Single Market?
It has often been argued that variations in market regulation in the member
countries of the EU continue to be formidable obstacles to European financial market
integration (Lamfalussy, 2000). The question has subsequently been raised whether
differences in market regulation are being upheld in order to protect domestic
companies from foreign competitors. This paper asks why national approaches to
sectoral regulation differ in the first place. If one is to believe the economic literature on
sectoral regulation, public intervention is only justified in cases of market failures (Kay
and Vickers, 1990). So, why do we see different approaches to market regulation?
Insurance here is seen as an interesting area of investigation as it is itself about
regulating risk. “[A] few years ago in Russia, it wasn’t possible to insurance your
baggage on a train, although you can now. Why couldn’t you insure it? Well because if
you lose your luggage, so what? These things happen, it’s an act of God. That’s how the
world used to be. The idea that you can cover every risk is an extraordinarily odd idea
but an intriguing one once you start to think about it. The idea of covering risk and the
notion of liability is bound up, and all these things are in some way central to the
attempt of western society to control the world” (Giddens, 1999).
Insurance is a device to cope with risk and uncertainty. In return for the payment
of a fee by the insuree, the insurer promises to pay a certain sum of money in the case
that the specified event occurs.
The concept of insurance (public as well as private) is fundamental to modern
welfare systems. In order to minimise risk (old age, sickness, death, accidents,
temporary incapacity, financial loss etc.) people enter into insurance scheme. Insurance
works on the principle of the law of large numbers: by sharing risks enough funds are
being pooled to provide financial coverage in case of loss. Insurance arrangements work
on two level: it provides cover in case of individual misfortune as well as enhancing the
social stability of society at large.30/08/01 - 3 - market or norms.doc
The socially important role of insurance was echoed in a judgement by the
European Court of Judgement in 1986: “the insurance sector is a particularly sensitive
area from the point of view of the protection of the consumer both as a policy-holder
and as an insured person. This is particular because of the specific nature of the service
provided by the insurer, which is linked to future events, the occurrence of which, or at
least the timing of which, is uncertain at the time when the contract is concluded. An
insured person who does not obtain payment under a policy following an event giving
rise to a claim may find himself in a very precarious position” (Commission vs.
Germany, case 205/84, paragraph 30, emphasis added).
Safe and stable insurance markets for the benefit and protection of policyholders
are the ultimate rationale of insurance supervision. However, there does not exist a
standard type regulatory approach to insurance in industrialised countries. Regulatory
practices differ from country to country, and so do the principles and rules that under
pin them.
This paper examines how insurance regulation in post-war Western Germany
was embedded in a larger framework of principles and ideals that governed economic
transactions. The argument focuses on how we can conceptualise the relationship
between belief systems and economic-regulatory practices.
Methodological Framework
The paper asks: why do regulatory agencies act the way they do? What informs
their behaviour? What is the relationship between the goals of regulation and their
practice.
The paper draws on the work of March and Olsen (1989, 1998) for its
methodological framework. In the first place it employs an institutional outlook:
“political institutions define the framework within which politics takes place” (March
and Olsen, 1989, p.18). Before we can ask how these institutions function, we need to
determine the exact meaning of the term ‘institution’.
“[A]n ‘institution’ can be viewed as a relatively stable collection of practices and
rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations.
Such rules and practices are embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of30/08/01 - 4 - market or norms.doc
interpretation, which explain and legitimize particular identities and the practices and
rules associated with them. Practices and rules are also embedded in resources and
principles of their allocation which makes it possible for individuals to enact roles in an
appropriate way and for a collectivity to socialize individuals and sanction those who
wander from proper behaviour” (March and Olsen, 1998, p.7).
The object of our inquiry is the practice and norms of insurance regulation in
Germany. Assessing this area, the paper employs a comprehensive approach. Sectoral
regulation, it is argued, needs to be examined against the background of the domestic
economic ‘constitution’. The characteristics of the domestic economic system - its key
operating structures, its principles and practices, and its institutionalised arrangements –
are interpreted to constitute an ‘institution’ in the March and Olsen meaning of the
word. The practice of insurance regulation is subsequently configured within this
overarching framework of principles and ideals.
Moving from the macro- to the micro-level: what shapes behaviour? March and
Olsen argue that political action follows a ‘logic of appropriateness’. “Linking action to
a logic of consequences seems to ignore the substantial role of identities, rules, and
institutions in shaping human behaviour. Within the tradition of a logic of
appropriateness, actions are seen as rule-based. Human actors are imagined to follow
rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual
opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice
dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations. Action involves evoking an
identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific
situation. The pursuit of purpose is associated with identities more than with interests;
and with the selection of rules more than with individual rational expectations” (March
and Olsen, 1998, p.11).
The link between the macro- and the micro-level of politics is therefore crucial
to an understanding of the ‘logic of appropriateness’. Political action is based on
identity and what is regarded as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in a specific situation.
Activities are mediated though institutions and the rules and routines that define the
institution. “The individual personality and will of political actors is less important;
historical traditions as they are recorded and interpreted within a complex of rules are
more important. A calculus of political costs and benefits is less important; a calculus of
identity and appropriateness is more important. Learning as recorded in history-30/08/01 - 5 - market or norms.doc
dependent routines and norms is more important; expectations of the future is less
important” (March and Olsen, 1989, p.38).
The Practice of Insurance Regulation
The 1950s in Germany saw the development of what has been described as the
Kölner Soziale Marktwirtschaft’ (see in particular the writings of Müller-Armack,
1956); a theory of market order that stipulated that organised groups in society –
churches, trade unions, sectoral associations etc. – are an integral part of national
economic activity, helping to create conditions of consensus that would deliver such
social goods as stability, redistribution, an equitable income policy etc. (Hank, 1999).
The idea of social partnership in the governance of the economy found its way into
regulatory politics. In post-war Germany, the insurance industry developed a strong
organisational structure, according to the type
1 of insurance business.
In a market order that was based on social consensus, the insurance industry’s
peak associations (Verbände) soon engaged in a systematic consultation with the
national regulatory authority: the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungswesen
(BAV). A system of consultation and co-ordination between the industry associations
and the BAV developed and consolidated over the years, leading to a situation where
prices, contract conditions and entry into the market became a matter of joint decision-
making (Moran, 1992).
Although formally under the supervision of the Ministry of Economics, the
national regulatory authority enjoyed far-reaching independence. With the passing of
the supervisory law in 1957, based on a law that goes back to the beginning of the
century, the agency was given considerable legal autonomy and a substantial degree of
operational independence from the interference of the federal government. The degree
of market control was legitimised by reference to the special needs of the private
insurees: the public authority was entrusted with the responsibility to protect the
interests of the insured as well as to safeguard the financial stability of the economy at
large. It was argued that market transparency for mass policyholders necessitated
1 Following the principle of Spartentrennung insurance companies were required to form legally separate businesses
according to the type of insurance services they were offering: life, health, legal-aid, motor liability, industrial
insurance etc.30/08/01 - 6 - market or norms.doc
largely standardised products and regulated prices. As the president of the BAV,
Angerer argued: “The reasons that led to the establishment of the national regulatory
agency in 1901 have not lost their validity; changing societal conditions have not made
them redundant. The activist and well-informed citizen that is the ideal of all our
policies is not as knowledgeable as we would wish. As regards the insurance business,
he would be forlorn without the help of the state”
2 (Angerer, 1985). Regulating
insurance was a way of maintaining macroeconomic stability. It was feared that
insurance bankruptcies could destabilise the entire macroeconomic and financial
system. Competition, so official reasoning went, was not in the interest of the insured as
it would introduce an element of instability in the system. Sectoral collaboration,
therefore, was benefiting the consumer by securing longer term stability while high
premiums guaranteed that insurance companies would meet their liabilities over the
long-term (Rees and Kessner, 1999).
Insurance Regulation and the ‘Economic Constitution’ of Ordo-liberalism
The objective of insurance regulation was to ensure that the benefits of a stable
market were equitably distributed throughout society, minimising market failures in the
form of insurance insolvencies or consumer discrimination. This approach to market
regulation was premised on the well-develop programme of Ordnungspolitik (often
translated as ‘ordo-liberalism’ to described its foundations in liberal thought) that
shaped the post-war economy in both its substantive and procedural aspects. Ordo-
liberal thought focused on the importance of an orderly framework of rules for the
economy and of institutional arrangements that would ensure an efficient functioning of
markets.
Ordoliberalism had developed in response to the failures of the Weimar
authorities to control the powerful industrial cartels and monopolies. What makes the
theory of Ordoliberalism stand out, is its attempt to theorise the link between the
2 ‘Die Gründe, die bei der Errichtung der Versicherungsaufsichtsbehörde ins Felde geführt wurde, haben auch heute
noch Gültigkeit. Sie sind duch die veränderten Verhältnisse keineswegs überholt. Der mündige Bürger, der uns als
Ideal vorschwebt, ist nicht auf allen Gebieten versiert. Im Versicherungswesen wäre er ohne staatliche Hilfe
hoffnungslos überfordert’.30/08/01 - 7 - market or norms.doc
economic order and individual liberty
3. Individual political freedom was to be
safeguarded by ensuring a liberal market order. A precondition to a functioning market
order was the protection of key individual rights: rights to property, right to trade,
liberty of contract, rules governing liability etc.
According to one of the principal proponents of ordo-liberal thought – Walter
Eucken – the state had an important role to play in creating the conditions for a
competitive market order. While ordo-liberalism’s main concern was with state powers
and their potential for harm to individual liberties, a weak state - as Weimar had shown
– was equally menacing. The answer to problem was a new type of ‘constitutionalised’
economic order that would govern state-economy and state-society relations.
Regulative principles were established from which the practice of regulation was to be
deducted. Based on this approach to market organisation, issues were not
contextualised, but were approached from an abstract point of view, to see where they
touched matters of principle. “The precondition of any integration is prior agreement on
the principles, systems and goals of action and behaviour” (Ludwig Erhard quoted in
Dyson and Featherstone, 1999, p.275). Economic system, in other words, did not just
‘happen’, but they were ‘formed’ (Gerber, 1994a, p.44).
Exempting Insurance, Reinforcing Stability?
Despite the enormous influence of ordo-liberal thought on the structuring of the
economy, certain sectors soon became exempted from the principle of competition.
Insurance was one of them.
Ordnungspolitik as such does not prescribe techniques but provides only general
principles. In post-war West Germany, a strong anti-trust law was the backbone of
Ordnungspolitik. The German Cartel Law has often been described as the cornerstone
of ordo-liberal politics: “the constitution of the German market order or the crown of a
free market
4” (Fehl and Schreiter, 1997, p.221). The central clause banning cartels
(Kartellverbot) however – the centrepiece of the government’s commitment to a liberal
market order – found little acceptance amongst industrialists and politicians in the
3 see Hayek, 1973
4 “Das Grundgesetz der Marktwirtschaft oder die Krone der marktwirtschaftlichen Ordnung”.30/08/01 - 8 - market or norms.doc
1950s. During the drafting stage of the bill the outright ban of cartels became the object
of strong lobbying efforts. The then Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, had
worked to have insurance included in the competition bill, but the Ministry of
Economics did not prove strong enough to overcome the resistance of the industry
(Everson, 1996). The final version of the law against restrictions on competition was
passed in 1957. It contained a clause that provided for the (partial) exemption of
insurance from the Kartellverbot. The nature of insurance, it was argued, required
controlled competitive conditions (Besonderheitenargument) and a special regulatory
approach to guarantee the social goods that stemmed from stable insurance markets.
The academic justifications were as follows:
1. Competition was to be curbed as bankruptcies of insurance companies would
undermine the trust in the system as well as harming individual policy-holders.
Access and in particular exit from the market had to be extensively controlled
(Zohlnhöfer and Eggerstedt, 1989)
2. Prevailing economic theory argued that the danger of ruinous competition was
particularly acute in the insurance market. The so-called ‘capacity argument’
(Kapazitätenargument) stipulated that given the low costs of increasing the supply
of insurance services, companies would enter into fierce competition thereby
undermining their long-term financial solvability. This argument proved very
influential in securing an exemption from the cartel law in the 1950s (Finsinger,
1989).
3. Furthermore it was argued that given the complexity of the insurance contract,
individual policyholders in the mass insurance markets were not in a position to
adequately assess the price-value relationship of the insurance product they are
purchasing. There was, therefore, a need to provide mechanisms that would make
the market transparent even to uniformed consumers.
Derogations from the general prohibition of cartels became an integral part of
German competition policy as other key sectors like banking, rail transport, agriculture
etc. were exempted from the prohibition of cartel arrangements. From its beginnings
there existed an inherent paradox in the German regulatory order: a system based on
liberal market order with strong institutions and principles to ‘police’ and safeguard
competition, while allowing the exemption from anti-trust control of vital industries.
Some observers argued that between 40 to 50% of all economic activity were exempted
from competition control (Fehl and Schreiter, 1997).30/08/01 - 9 - market or norms.doc
Hardach argues that Germany’s tradition of supporting business concentration in
order to further the state’s hegemonic interests found its way into the post-war system.
“Quite in contrast to the Anglo-American view, which connected competitive markets
with equilibrium and monopolistic situations with indeterminacy and disorder, it was
held that unrestricted competition was ‘destructive’ and that cartels were an ‘element of
order’” (Hardach, 1980, p.148’).
Who were the Actors?
Who implemented the constitutional design? Who applied and enforced the
aspects of the ordo-liberal thought that related to insurance?
In an excellent article on German competition policy, Gerber (1994b) traces the
relationship between the expert community, authority and regulatory practice. He
identifies three structural aspects:
a) membership in an established ‘leadership community’ is crucial to authoritative
judgement and defines ‘voice’ in regulatory politics;
b) the internal hierarchy of the leadership community matters in terms of how ‘voice’
is weighted; ranking is defined by professional status and reputation;
c) the regulatory community is closely-knit and consists exclusively of academics,
judges and practitioners. “The contours of this community are relatively distinct. It
includes the leading officials of the Federal Competition Office, the judges in the
chambers of the courts responsible for reviewing competition law decisions,
professors (primarily law professors, but also some economists) who are active in
competition law matter, and many practitioners who write in the area. Virtually all
decisions of importance in German competition law are made, or heavily influenced,
by the hundred or so members of this group” (Gerber, 1994b, p.538).
These findings can be applied to insurance regulation. Here, however, the links
with federal ministries were stronger and representatives from industry enjoyed
membership in the expert community (Everson, 1996). Like the president of the Federal
Cartel Office, the president of the BAV was a very influential public figure - speaking
on behalf of the mass consumers. He was also a central authority within the community
of insurance experts, setting the agenda and influencing the direction of policies. It was
his endorsement of the key European insurance directives that helped the European30/08/01 - 10 - market or norms.doc
Commission secure much needed support for deregulation within the insurance
community in Germany in the late 1980s.
Like in competition policy, one also finds close links between academic scholars
and judicial and administrative practitioners in insurance regulation. Special status was
granted to academics. “In a community that is based on scholarship, professors are
likely to have power, because scholarship is a principal part of what they are paid for”
(Gerber, 1994, p.539).
Until the early 1990s, representatives of mass policy-holders were not part of the
system of regulation. Direct participation of consumers of insurance services was
limited to industrial customers. This is changing now as a result of deregulation and
market opening. It does, however, mirror the paternalistic nature of much regulation in
post-war Germany. The BAV had a self-image as a consumer protection institution
while denying consumer organisations a voice in the regulatory process. “In this respect
Ordoliberalism was grounded in German traditions: respect for the expert and for the
role of subjectivity (Sachlichkeit) in public affairs; of belief in a strong state standing
above the economic struggle; and of valuing the clarity and predictability that come
from observance of rules in economic policy” (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999, p.277).
Due to the close relations between decision-makers and practitioners, the
regulatory system was highly autonomous and achieved remarkable internal consensus
about the rules of ‘appropriateness’. By the same token it achieved a high degree of
stability. Norms and discourses operated self-referentially; actors were imbued with a
sense of “ethical purpose” (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999, p.277).
Assessing Regulatory Practice and its Changing Nature
Reflecting the experience of social and economic upheaval of the Weimar Republic,
the economic constitution that emerged in post-war western Germany valued social
stability and continuity. “Social security (Sicherheit) and social justice are the greatest
concerns of our time” (Eucken, quoted in Gerber, 1994a, p.37). A canon of normatively
justified beliefs emerged that framed regulatory policies. In terms of the normative
order, social security was ranked highest. The practice of regulation was impregnated
with a belief in the beneficial nature of public agency. Regulatory activity itself was
based on identifying the appropriate behaviour within the terminology of rules and30/08/01 - 11 - market or norms.doc
duties to the ‘citizen consumer’. Belief systems were internalised through socialisation
into the routines of the practitioner community. Norms, however, were slow to change.
As late as 1985 a leading figure in the insurance expert community still argued that
“competition and insurance are two opposing principles” (Ritter, 1985).
At this point it might be asked whether European efforts to deregulate the sector
represented a breaking point in the practice of insurance regulation or was the process of
change incremental? As a result of European market opening, have the values that frame
regulatory behaviour changed?
European efforts to deregulate financial markets towards the end of the 1980s,
buttressed the voices of the domestic pro-competition forces in Germany. Liberal
academics in the tradition of Ordnungspolitik had for long argued that the exemption of
the insurance sector from the cartel law was an anomaly of the economic order of post-
war Germany (Schmidt, 1980, Finsinger, 1986, Eickhof, 1993).
These ‘voices’ became increasingly vocal in the early to mid-1980s as scholarly
debated shifted to a renewed interest in the benefits of competition. Publications by
independent commissions (Sachverständigenrat und Monopolkommission)
5, active
outside the insurance community, drew attention to the degree of public intervention in
the insurance sector. What was later described as a ‘politicisation of regulation’ (Dyson,
1992) was in the first instance a changing debate in academic circles. The Ministry of
Economics as well as the Federal Cartel Office, however, were quick to mobilize
resource to steer the debate further into the direction of less regulation (Schlecht, 1997).
The new ideas were absorbed and discussed by the ‘leadership community’ with
strategic input from the Federal Ministries and the Federal Cartel Office (Wolters,
1995). As a result, the goals and instruments of regulation were re-assessed and
alternatives were considered. The debate began to slowly embrace a conception of
competition as beneficial to the economy, changing the rules according to which
regulatory practices were operated.
As regards change, March and Olsen argue: “The transformation of institutions is
neither dictated completely by exogenous conditions nor controllable precisely by
intentional actions. For the most part, institutions evolve through a relatively mundane
5 Monopolkommission (1988) Die Wettbewerbsordnung erweitern: Hauptgutachten Monopolkommission
1986/1987; see also: Soltwedel, Rüdiger (1987) Zur staatlichen Marktregulierung in der BRD30/08/01 - 12 - market or norms.doc
set of procedures sensitive to relatively diffuse mechanisms of control. Ideas about
appropriate behaviour ordinarily change gradually through the development of
experience and the elaboration of worldviews” (March and Olsen, 1989, p.171).
Changes in the external environment contributed to a review of ‘worldviews’ within
the regulatory community: the European Commission’s single market programme
challenged the practice of insurance regulation in Germany, arguing that it functioned as
a barrier to market integration. The argument however was met with strong opposition
inside the German insurance expert community. What was contested was the process by
which regulatory authority was allocated to the European level, removing a substantial
degree of autonomy and policy responsibility from the domestic domain. More
specifically, the struggle was over the legitimate jurisdiction of regulation – European
or national.
However, as March and Olsen point out, “institutions are not simple reflections of
current exogenous forces or micro-behaviour and motives” (p.167). Absorbing the
external challenges, institutions simultaneously define the environment within which
the conflicts are resolved. As a resource, institutions draw on their own institutional
knowledge, experience and routines. Change is about revising embedded rules, as
mediated by the institutional framework. “Unless we assume that a political
environment is stable, it is likely that the rate of change in the environment will exceed
the rate of adjustment to it” (March and Olsen, 1989, p.168).
The authors stress that change is essentially a process of institutional adaptation and
reaction and that there are strong interconnections between the institution that is made
subject to reform and the larger exogenous environment. Institutions, in other words,
evolve and it often takes some time before the consequences of reform become
apparent.
Sometimes, however, the speed of adjustment is a matter of concern – not just for
regulators, but for the success of a policy. “The result could in fact be seen as a victory
for the minimalist position. However, the game is not yet over. If, on the one hand few
benefits in terms of market unification materialize, and there are cogent arguments for
this possible outcome, while, on the other hand, the predictions of the dire consequences
of deregulation and competition made by the maximalist school are at least in part
confirmed, then there may well be a Europe-wide tightening of insurance market30/08/01 - 13 - market or norms.doc
regulation” (Rees and Kessner, 1999, p.366). The battle over the appropriate degree of
insurance regulation, it seems, is not yet over. And there is still a lot of institutional
adjustment and learning to be achieved – amongst all parties.
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